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Abstract
We run an experiment that implements a finitely repeated version of
the trust game in which players can choose in each period with whom to
interact. Change in trust and trustworthiness in terms of previous experi-
ence is statistically investigated where confounding factors are controlled
for. Motives such as reinforcement learning, reciprocity and rationality are
useful to explain findings. Overall we find a high persistence of choice and
uncover more trust and trustworthiness than in the one shot experiments.
Towards the end of the game the degree of trust and trustworthiness de-
cline.
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1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate trust and trustworthiness in a
dynamic setting. We provide alternative behavioral motives for such behavior
and test for them. We set up an experiment where trust can emerge as the
result of an experimentally controlled interaction between individuals. Hence,
we do not just study the general propensity of people to trust, but the motives
that determine the evolution of trust in repeated interactions.
In the trust game a player is given 100 units of the experimental currency
and is allowed to send some to a different player. During the transaction the
transferred money is tripled. Finally the recipient is allowed to return part
of the tripled transfer with no obligation how much to return to the sender.
The money sent can be interpreted as an investment in a project, the increase
during the transfer as the return on investment. The project is managed by the
recipient who decides how to divide the surplus.
The way that game theory analyzes this trust game is to invoke backwards
induction. For any given amount transferred the receiver is best off not return-
ing anything. If the sender knows that he will never get back anything then
he will not send anything. The outcome of this behavior is inefficient. This is
reminiscent of the Prisoners’ Dilemma where similarly an inefficient outcome is
predicted by game theory. Any efficient outcome (equivalent here to maximiz-
ing the sum of the payoff of the sender and of the receiver) is characterized by
the sender sending all 100 units (so the recipient receives 300 units). In our
experiment we implement a repeated trust game where players have the oppor-
tunity to select a new opponent in each round. However, given that there is a
finite number of rounds (6 in our experimental design), the backwards induction
argument yields the same result. No player should ever send anything.
The rational prediction is mainly a theoretical benchmark as experiments
show that subjects trust (send money) even when the trust game is played
only once. Berg et al. [1995] find that subjects send slightly above 50 points
and return slightly less to the sender and keep over 100 points for themselves.
Among their subjects it was not rational, given the behavior of the recipients
who on average return 47 points, to transfer anything. Burks et al. [2002] show
that if two subjects get money to send to each other simultaneously (so both
are sender and receiver) then subjects send again about 50 points but return
much less, namely on average 24 points. Here it is even less rational to send
money. Or in other words, subjects are even less trustworthy when they are
both sender and receiver. Our design is related to Burks et al. [2002] as all
subjects are senders and possibly also receivers. It is also related to Cochard
et al. [2000] as we repeat the game a finite number of times. It is different as
subjects can choose who to transfer money to.
As game theory is a poor predictor we test for other motives such as re-
inforcement, reciprocity and directional learning. We find that much of the
observed behavior in the game can be explained by the two motives reciprocity
and reinforcement learning. Players reward opponents for their choices and
their actions if their behavior was favorable. This is visible in the choice, the
transfer made and the ratio returned. In addition, payoff oriented reinforce-
ment is also observable. Players are more likely to repeat their actions if they
have proven successful. Finally, the end game effect that can be observed both
in the transfers made as in the ratio returned is indicative for some degree of
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rationality.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our
experiment and the main findings to the existing literature. The experimen-
tal design is described in detail in section 3. Section 4 presents some general
descriptive statistics on the game. Different behavioral motives are briefly dis-
cussed in section 5 before an econometric analysis is undertaken in section 6.
The last section concludes and discusses directions for further research.
2 Related Literature
While sociologists mainly use attitudinal surveys on rather vaguely defined con-
cepts of trust and trustworthiness, economists have recently been trying to be
more precise on the issue and its conditioning factors. Glaeser et al. [2000] com-
bine survey data and experimental data in an attempt to quantify the general
perception of trust towards different groups surrounding an individual. There
is evidence that trust and trustworthiness are related to the sociological back-
ground of people. For example, Buchan et al. [2000] find mixed support for the
relationship between trust and social distance across countries. Fershtman and
Gneezy [2001] find different levels of trust according to the opponents’ origin.
Croson and Buchan [1999], among others, identify gender as another determi-
nant for trust, with women being trusted more than men. These results stress
the importance of controlling for confounding factors when the emergence of
trust in an economic interaction is analyzed.
Our experimental design combines several elements of previous studies. The
basic trust game with one sender and one randomly matched receiver is known
from the study by Berg et al. [1995]. In this study pairs are matched with
assigned roles as sender and receivers to play a one shot trust game. We follow
the extension by Burks et al. [2002] that both players assume the role of a sender
and receiver at the same time. However, contrary to this study, this was known
to the players from the outset. We also combine the element of a repeated game
as analyzed by Cochard et al. [2000], but also run a control treatment with one
shot interactions. In addition, we add the element of a free choice, which to
our knowledge has not been investigated in this context. Our results compare
nicely to the existing literature as indicated by table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Results and related literature
avg. sent average
study N (0-100) returned comment
Berg et al. [1995] 32·2 52 47a assigned roles as S or R, one shot
Burks et al. [2002] 22·2 65 85a assigned roles as S or R, one shot
Burks et al. [2002] 20·2 47 24a both are S and R, one shot
Cochard et al. [2000] 30·2 42 39%b assigned roles, one shot
Cochard et al. [2000] 16·2 75 56%b assigned roles, repeated
this study: repeated 110 76 54%b both S and R, choice, repeated
this study: random assignment 110 67 38%b random assignment
Note: S and R mean sender and receiver respectively, a amount sent back, b
ratio returned, conditional on having received a positive amount.
With experimental economics being a rather new field in economics, a thor-
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ough econometric analysis of experimental data is more the exception than the
rule. Numerous studies content themselves with basic descriptive statistics and
significance tests. The advantages of an econometric analysis is that confound-
ing factors can be controlled for, which may prevent premature interpretation
of results and that hypothesis can be singled out more clearly. However, to link
the experimental setup to the correct econometric specification is not always an
easy task. For example, with the exception of rather simple games the derivation
of a likelihood function is intractable for more complicated settings. Hence the
correspondence between the theoretical model and the empirical specification
is not perfect. An exception in this context is the analysis by El-Gamal and
Grether [1995] who are able to translate their (simple) game one-to-one into a
likelihood function, estimate and identify the relevant parameters.
Identification is a particular problem in the context of behavioral economics.
As Manski [2002] points out, several behavioral hypothesis might be observa-
tionally equivalent, making it impossible for the econometrician to distinguish
between them. Our aim is to characterize typical behavior at different stages of
the game. We confine ourselves to find empirical support for or evidence against
such hypothesis controlling for confounding factors.
3 Experimental design
The experiment was conducted using a computerized setup1 in 4 sessions at
the European University Institute near Florence, Italy. Participants were 110
Masters and PhD students from the faculties of Law (30%), History (15%),
Social and Political Sciences (23%), and Economics (33%). Subjects originated
from 15 different European countries. They were between 23 and 36 years
old (average: 27.7), and 64% were male. Because it was the first time that
experiments were conducted at this place, the subject pool was not experienced
in playing games. For each of the four sessions a multiple of five subjects was
recruited. The profit earned by participants ranged from Euro 24 to Euro 47.90,
with an average of Euro 36.34 (s.d. 4.89), including a 5 Euro show up fee paid
to each candidate. Each session (including a 15 min. questionnaire at the end)
lasted for about 2 hours. Participants were recruited via email and were invited
to sign up on a website. Each session took place in 2-3 computer labs with 10 to
25 computers each, located in different buildings of the university campus. Upon
arrival to an assigned computer lab, subjects randomly drew a seat number and
an account number. This account number was later used to identify subjects
for payment, which was organized anonymously. Further to that, the computer
labs were prepared using separators to individualize the environment. In each
room, a professor of the university monitored the experiment in a discrete way.
Appendix B has further information about the experimental design. Section
B.1 contains a transcript of the instructions. Note that at no point in time
subjects were deceived. Subjects could choose how often (max 3 times) they
wanted to read through the instructions on the screen. They also had a hard
copy of the instructions next to their machines. The instructions were followed
by a short quiz of three questions covering the crucial aspects of the game
(see appendix B.4). We conclude that all subjects understood the game very
well before playing. No major clarification questions were asked. After reading
1Using the Z-Tree software, Fischbacher [1999]
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through the instructions subjects were asked to enter information about their
age, gender, nationality, and the number of siblings. To increase anonymity,
the age displayed to fellow players was modified by adding a random number.
This was also mentioned in the instructions further to a general anonymity and
privacy statement which can be found in section B.2.
Each session consisted of six treatments. In each treatment, subjects were
randomly matched in groups of five players to play the repeated trust game
described below.
Free Choice treatments
Treatments one to four and treatment six were so called ’free choice’ treatments
(f1-f5). In stage one of the game, each player could see some information about
the four other players in his group (see figure B.2, the information included
the players’ nationality, age, gender, and the number of siblings). The subject
then decided who and how much of his initial endowment of 100 to transfer
to the player chosen. No entry in any of the boxes corresponds to making no
choice, which was also an option. In stage two, (see figure B.3) subjects saw
who of the other players had chosen them and how much each of them had
transferred. In addition, this amount was shown multiplied by three. For each
player by which a player was chosen (this could be any from 0 to 4 players),
they could choose how much to transfer back. In stage three (see figure B.3)
subjects were presented a summary of all transfers and returns they had been
involved with that happened in this period. The three stages were repeated 6
times. Then, groups were reshuffled and a new treatment was played. Due to
the limited amount of subjects in each session and the large size of each group,
the re-matching had to be done on a random basis, hence it is not ruled out
that subjects could meet again in subsequent groups.
Control Treatment
Between the fourth and the fifth free choice treatment subjects were informed
via the screen about a small change in the game. They were again matched
in groups of five players, but instead of being able to choose a fellow player,
they were randomly assigned one of the fellow players (see figure B.5). We also
call this the predetermined treatment. Random assignment was implemented
by selecting independently for each individual one of the four other players to
transfer to, each with equal probability. Hence it was still possible that the
same player receives transfers from different players or from no player but these
events were random. In every period of this treatment players faced a new,
random choice of the same group. After this treatment, subjects played a last
free choice treatment.
4 Descriptive Statistics
The following statistics are organized around the course of the game, starting
with statistics regarding the choice, then the amount transferred, and lastly the
amount returned. They provide a rough description of the playing behavior.
Empirical evidence and interpretation of types will be discussed in section 6.
Unless indicated differently, the statistics do not include the control treatment.
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4.1 Choice
In each period subjects had the option to choose one of the four players in their
group to transfer points to. This group of players remained unchanged for six
consecutive periods. Table 4.1 summarizes by treatment and period how often
subjects decided not to change their playing partner. The analysis period by
period shows a slight increase in periods 2-5 from 53% to 57%, and quite a
pronounced drop to just 47% who stay with the same partner in the last period.
There was also considerable persistence in the choice of partner exceeding one
Table 4.1: Fraction of players that chose the same player as in previous period
period of treatment
treatment 2 3 4 5 6 total
f1 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.47 0.48
f2 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.54 0.46 0.53
f3 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.53
f4 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.64 0.45 0.55
f5 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.58 0.41 0.53
total 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.47 0.52
Note: Each treatment/period combination was played 110
times.
period. From table 4.2 it can be seen that while the in the majority of cases
a player was chosen only once (58%), 24% of the players remained with the
same choice for at least two periods or more. 2% did not change the player
throughout an entire treatment.
Table 4.2: Persistence of choice of player
number of consecutive periods
0 1 2 3 4 5
absolute 1899 603 339 225 156 78
fraction 58 18 10 7 5 2
Note: Contrary to table 4.1 this table includes pe-
riod 1.
[provide additional table in which row shows number of transfers received
in previous period and column shows percentage of events ”no switch” ”switch
to received” ”switch to new but not received”. Additional descriptive statistic
needed for choice behavior (eg relating choice to motives?)]
4.2 Transfer
The average transfer was 76 tokens. Figure 4.1 shows how the transfer depends
on period and treatment, where the control treatment is also included. It reveals
a significant drop in the last period of each treatment. All free choice treatments
exhibit the same effect over time. On average, the amount transferred increases
from 72 in period 1 to 83 in period 4, decreases slightly to 80 in period 5 before
it drops to 56 in the last period, well below value of the starting period. Notice
that this is similar to the average transfers in one shot experiments. The average
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amount transferred rises from 64 in the f1 treatment to 81 in f5 treatment (solid
line). The average in the control treatment is 66 and therefore as low as the
first treatment. Remind the reader that the control treatment was the fifth
treatment and as can be seen from Figure 4.1 the transfer behavior in the sixth
and last treatment resumed the pattern of the previous free choice treatment.
This shows that subjects understood well the difference between the control and
the free choice treatments. 2
Figure 4.1: Average transfer per period and treatment
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There is a clustering of transfers at certain values, as table 4.3 illustrates. In
56% of the cases the full amount of 100 points was transferred. A second point
mass is at the value of 50, which was the amount transferred in 9% of the cases.
Table 4.3: Distribution of transfer τ .
percentage
τ = free choice predetermined
0 7 18
1 ≤ τ ≤ 49 12 7
50 9 12
51 ≤ τ ≤ 17 17
100 56 46
4.3 Return Ratio
The ratio a player got back from his initial transfer is defined as r = G/(3 · τ),
where G is the amount returned and τ is the initial transfer which is multiplied
by three upon arrival on the opponent’s account. Hence, r[0, 1]. The average
return ratio (54) does not have such a large variation between the free choice
2For a histogram of transfers period by period, see figure A.1 in the appendix.
7
treatments (0.51-0.59) but is significantly lower in the control treatment (0.39).
The end game effect is also quite visible in the free choice treatments, where
the ratio drops from an average of 0.58 in periods 1-5 to 0.33 in the last period.
In the predetermined treatment the return ratio around 45 for the first three
periods and then drops steadily to just 22 in the last period. Figure 4.2 depicts
this behavior in greater detail.
Figure 4.2: Average ratio returned per period and treatment
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The return ratio clusters at certain values, as table 4.4 illustrates. In the
free choice treatments the biggest point mass is at 1 and at 2/3, followed by 1/2
and 0. Looking at figure A.2 in the appendix we see that the end game effect is
driven by the large share of zero return ratios (37 as compared to 8 percent in
periods 1-5). In comparison, we find 48 percent of return ratios equal to zero in
the last period of the predetermined treatment.
Table 4.4: Distribution of the return ratio r
percentage
r = free choice predetermined
0 12 20
0 < r < 1/3 6 9
1/3 9 13
1/3 < r < 1/2 7 10
1/2 16 22
1/2 < r < 1/2 7 7
2/3 18 13
2/3 < r < 1 7 3
1 18 3
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4.4 Payoff
Following table 4.5 we see that the average payoffs are higher in the free choice
treatments. The decline in payoffs starts earlier in the predetermined choice
treatment.
Table 4.5: Payoffs
periods 1 2 3 4 5 6 total
free choice 155 168 171 166 150 104 152
predetermined 127 123 125 112 95 85 111
4.5 Summary
The choice of players in the first stage is not random, players show a substantial
reluctance to switch to new players. If so, they seem to prefer those players who
they have been chosen by before. Previous interaction seems to have a positive
effect both on the transfer and on the ratio that is returned to a sender. One
can further see from the analysis that players transfer and return more in each
repetition of the game up to period 4. In period 5 the end game effect starts,
which is visible by stagnating or slightly decreasing transfers. It peaks in the
last period where substantially less is transferred and returned.
5 Motives and Behavioral Theories for making
Predictions
Several motives and learning theories compete in explaining the way people
behave. Below we present the most common, namely reinforcement learning,
reciprocity, directional learning and rationality. We will then develop hypotheses
based on these motives for choice, transfer and return and then test them.
Our approach is to utilize the qualitative predictions of these motives rather
than fitting explicit functional forms derived from them.
Reinforcement learning (RIF)
Reinforcement Learning describes success oriented behavior according to which
the subject choose actions or strategies according to how successful they were
in the past. Success is measured in terms of earned payoffs. Originating from
psychology and biology, where it has been widely studied in both humans and
animals, this learning strategy has recently been introduced to economics [Erev
and Roth, 1998]. Accordingly, individuals treat the environment as a decision,
do not utilize information on how payoffs are generated and in particular ignore
the fact that their opponents are also making choices. The subject is assumed
to randomize over its actions according to some distribution. Positive reinforce-
ment means that when facing the same decision again the same action is chosen
with a higher probability. Typically, positive reinforcement is more likely the
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more successful an action was. Negative reinforcement in turns means that the
same action will be chosen with a smaller probability.
Reciprocity (RCP)
Reciprocity is a motive oriented behavior. Cooperative and friendly behavior
is rewarded and unfriendly or non–cooperative behavior is punished, possibly
at a cost. [Falk, 2003, Falk and Fischbacher, 1999] provide a formal definition
of reciprocity in a specific game–theoretic setting. It is important to highlight
that altruism, in contrast to reciprocity, is an unconditional attitude (see e.g.
Cox [2002]), whereas reciprocity conditions on the actions of others.
Directional learning type (DLT)
The Directional Learning approach was developed by Selten and Stoecker [1986]
for simultaneous move games. According to this theory, after some experience
people evaluate their experience and adjust their behavior according to what
would have been a better decision provided that the opponents would not change
their behavior. DLT does not make any predictions about the quantitive change
of behavior, but indicates the qualitative direction of the change.
Rationality (RTN)
The finitely repeated trust game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in which each player sends 0 in each period and returns 0 whenever something
positive is received. This can be derived using the standard procedure of back-
wards induction, anticipating a zero return in the last period from a rational
player, no player will ever transfer any points in the preceding period and so
forth.
6 Econometric Analysis
6.1 The choice of a player
In the first stage of the game, subjects had the possibility to choose between
four players or they could decide not to transfer any points.
The motives outlined in section 5 (RIF, RCP, DLT, RTN) will be used to
predict how choice probabilities change over time. Hypotheses are formulated
from the perspective of a sending player.
Hypothesis RCP 1 One is more likely to choose a player from which a trans-
fer was received in the previous period and who transferred a lot.
Hypothesis RCP 2 One is more likely to choose the same again if that player
returned a lot.
Hypothesis RIF 1 One is more likely to choose the same again if the payoff
was high.
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Hypothesis DLT 1 One is more likely to choose the same again if that player
returned more than one sent (returned ratio is greater or equal than 1/3).
The framework in which the theoretical predictions will be addressed is the
conditional logit model [McFadden, 1973]. The multiple choice model is moti-
vated using a random utility model representation. Define
Uijt as the utility of i if i chooses j at time t, and
dijt =
{
1 if i chooses j in t,
0 otherwise.
In the game under consideration, each player has five choices, j = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4},
at each point in time. A period t extents over all three stages of the game:
choice, transfer, and transfer back. The five choices are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive. The choice j = 0 is the decision to make no transfer at all, and this
utility is normalized to zero. The basic random utility model is defined as:
Ui0t = 0
Uijt = αdijt−1 + δdjit−1 + λpijt−1 + νXj + ijt
(1)
for j = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Following the notation above, dijt−1 means that player i
has chosen j in the previous period. Similarly, djit−1 means that player j has
chosen player i in the previous round. Finally, pijt−1 means that i and j have
formed a pair in the previous period and is the interaction of the previous two
variables. Note that, put together, these variables cover all possible cases in
which there was interaction, as compared to the case in which the players have
not interacted in t − 1. The other covariates Xj include the remaining choice
specific characteristics such as gender, nationality3 (both interacted with the
corresponding attributes of i) age, and siblings. Notice that the previous choice
of i is interpreted as a characteristic of the choice j in t. By the same token, the
fact that a player was chosen by some other player in period t − 1 becomes a
characteristic of that player in t. Hence, previous playing behavior can be seen
as observable choice specific attributes in t.
So far only the model only accounts for the choice relating variables, e.g.
if a a player was chosen or not. In an additional set of estimates, the random
utility model presented in (1) will be enriched by adding variables characterizing
in more detail the previous behavior. To this end, the choice variables defined
above will be interacted with variables indicating a specific behavior, as outlined
in the hypothesis. Define τijt−1 as the transfer from i to j in t − 1 and Gijt−1
as the amount player i got back from player j in t− 1. Then,
rijt−1 =
Gijt−1
3 · τijt−1 is the ratio i got back from j in t− 1
piijt−1 =100− τijt−1 +Gijt−1 is the payoff of player i in t− 1
In addition, the variable τjit−1, the amount i received from j in t − 1 will be
used. Notice that these variables only take positive values if the respective
3Throughout the paper we group the nationalities into participants from North and par-
ticipants from South. Further analysis of the effect of nationality on the playing behavior can
be found in Bornhorst et al. [2004].
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choice specific dummy variables defined above take the value one and are zero
otherwise. For example, τjit−1 only takes positive values if djit−1 is one.
Player i chooses player j if this yields highest utility. Hence,
P(dijt = 1) = P(Uijt > Uikt) ∀ k 6= j.
Table 6.1 and 6.2 contain the estimation results of various specifications of
the conditional logit model. For convenience, the choice variables are repre-
sented using arrows, where dijt−1 is represented by a dashed arrow i 99K j and
the pair variable by a double arrow i↔ j. Notice that in i refers to the person
making the choice.
Consider specification C1. This model disregards any success or failure of
previous choices and forms the basis for the following analysis. It is evident that
that having chosen a player before and having been chosen by a player makes
it more likely to choose that player again. The effects are of the same order
of magnitude, with the effect of i L99 j being slightly bigger. Interestingly the
effect of having formed a pair does not significantly alter the choice probabilities,
suggesting that there is no pair-specific effect. In the following specifications
this variable is dropped. Hypothesis RCP 1, that the probability of choosing
a player is increasing in the the amount received from that player is addressed
in specification C2 in table 6.1, where the variable which indicates that i L99 j
is multiplied by the amount transferred. Indeed, the likelihood of choosing a
player who transferred previously is increasing in the transfer received. Hence,
hypothesis RCP 2 finds empirical support.
Table 6.1: Choice: conditional logit estimation results 1
C1 C2 C3 C4
i↔ j .006 . . .
(.11)
i 99K j 1.24 1.20 -.10 -.45
(.06)∗∗∗ (.04)∗∗∗ (.10) (.11)∗∗∗
i L99 j 1.41 .07 .33 .35
(.07)∗∗∗ (.17) (.17)∗∗ (.17)∗∗
i L99 j · τji . .02 .01 .01
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
i 99K j · rij . . 2.41 .
(.16)∗∗∗
i 99K j · piij . . . .01
(.0007)∗∗∗
Obs. 13750 13750 13750 13750
Pseudo R2 .25 .25 .28 .29
log likelihood -3337.8 -3297.78 -3171.2 -3137.02
Note: All variables refer to the previous playing round. Reported values are coeffi-
cients, standard errors in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ denote significance to the 10, 5 and
1 percent level. Controls included are: age and siblings of all 4 players, gender and
nationality of i interacted with the attributes of j.
Hypothesis RCP 2 which states that choosing the same again is more likely
if that player returned a lot is addressed in specification C3, where the ratio the
player returned in the previous period is added. Notice that this specification
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also controls for the amount received by a player in the previous playing round.
The significance of the interacted variable i 99K j rij shows empirical support
for Hypothesis RCP 2. Looking at the variable i 99K j in C2 we find that the
same player is more likely to be chosen again. In C4 we then add the payoff
resulting from this interaction. Here we find that reinforcement depends on the
success of the previous action; if the payoff was above 45 then we find positive
reinforcement as probability of choosing the same again is higher, confirming
RIF 1. Negative reinforcement is triggered when the payoff is below 45, which
is the case in 10 percent of the cases. Notice that we do not include both in the
same regression as i 99K j rij and i 99K j piij are highly collinear.
Table 6.2: Choice: conditional logit estimation results 2
C5 C6
i L99 j .36 .22
(.17)∗∗ (.17)
i L99 j · τji .01 .01
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
i 99K j ∧ rij ≥ 1/2 1.63 .
(.05)∗∗∗
i 99K j ∧ rij < 1/2 .32 .
(.08)∗∗∗
i 99K j ∧ rij ≥ 1/3 . 1.4
(.05)∗∗∗
i 99K j ∧ rij < 1/3 . .17
(.12)
Obs. 13750 13750
Pseudo R2 .28 .27
log likelihood -3198.2 -3246.4
Note: See notes to table 6.1.
Notice that hypothesis RCP 2 and is a more general version of DLT 1. While
the former just makes a general statement about how the return ratio affects
choice, the latter is very specific in determining a break point at 1/3. To shed
more light on the functional form, specifications C5 and C6 in table 6.2 test a
breakpoint at 1/2 and one at 1/3 respectively. Notice that 1/2 is the median
return ratio. From specification C6 it becomes evident that players do not chose
the same player more likely if the ratio returned previously was lower than 1/3.
This can interpreted as evidence for DLT 1. For a breakpoint at 1/2 no such
evidence can be found, players still are more likely to chose a player who has
returned less than 1/2 (see C5). [??hopefully andrea or eyal can help us get
more out of this table.]
Table 6.3 summarizes the main results of this section.
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Table 6.3: Choice: summary of findings
hypothesis ...probability of i choosing j is higher if significance magnitude
RCP 1 i received a lot from j yes 3.0
RCP 2 j returned a lot previously yes 3.3
DLT 1 j returned more than i sent yes 3.5
RIF 1 i had a high payoff yes 2.9
Note: Magnitude reports the effect on the odds of choosing a player. The
odds are evaluated at the average of each variable using the estimated
coefficients. [We have to discuss if this is the right procedure.]
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6.2 The amount transferred
After a player has chosen who to send to, players could choose how much of
their endowment of each period to transfer to a player. Our motives will be
used to predict changes in amount transferred. These motives are formulated
analogous to the choice setting, where an increase in transfers is the equivalent
action to increasing the probability of choice.
Hypothesis RCP 3 Conditional on choosing a player from which a transfer
was received in previous period, current transfer is increasing in transfer re-
ceived.
Hypothesis RCP 4 Conditional on choosing the same player again, transfer
is increasing in the ratio returned in the previous period.
Hypothesis RIF 2 Conditional on choosing the same player again, transfer
is increasing in the payoff received in the previous period.
Hypothesis DLT 2 Conditional on choosing the same player again, transfer
is higher (lower) if the ratio returned in the previous period is greater (smaller)
than 1/3.
Hypothesis RTN 1 Transfer is lower in the last period.
The basic framework in which the hypothesis will be addressed is
τit = αdijt−1 + βdjit−1 + δXjt + ηZit + uit
which forms the basis for the analysis. The variable dijt−1 and djit−1 are as
defined in the previous section. The matrices Xjt and Zit contain a set of j
and i specific characteristics respectively and uit is a random error component.
According to the hypothesis, the choice variables dijt−1 and djit−1 will be in-
teracted with variables that characterize previous playing behavior such as the
amount transferred or the ratio returned. Because there are repeated observa-
tions for the same individual in the sample, the standard errors are corrected
for any possible within-individual correlations.4
To facilitate the reading of the tables, the following notation is introduced.
Let S denote the sender and R denote the receiver.5 Consistent with notation
above,
• S 99K R denotes that S has chosen R in t− 1
• S L99 R denotes that R has chosen S in t− 1
• S −R denotes that S and R had no interaction in t− 1
4See Moulton [1986].
5The notation differs from the (i, j) notation used in the analysis of choice because at this
stage of the game players have already chosen a particular receiver among the possible options,
hence j becomes R.
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Notice that these variables sum up to one. In the subsequent analysis, S−R
will be the omitted variable.
The hypotheses distinguish between the behavior towards the same and dif-
ferent choice. Hence, variables are interacted with a variable that indicates
whether the same choice was made in t and t − 1. If a variable corresponds to
the set of same choice or the set of different choice will be indicated by s and
d, respectively.
Consider table 6.4. Specification T1 forms the starting point for the analy-
sis. Transfers are higher if the same subject is chosen again, transfers increase
on average by 7 points. Having been chosen by a player previously increases
transfers on average by 11 points. In specification T2 the amount received is
interacted with the indicator (S L99 R). Notice that in order to determine the
effect of received transfers on own transfers one has to take account the coef-
ficient of the variable (S L99 R), which is negative and significant - this is the
intercept of the functional relation between the amount received and transfer
made. For example, with an intercept of −20 and a slope of 1/3, the results
suggest that only if the transfer received was higher than 60 points this had a
positive effect on the own transfer. This is evidence for hypothesis RCP 3.
Hypothesis RCP 4, which relates transfers to the ratio returned in the pre-
vious round also finds empirical support, as can be seen from specification T3.
This is evident from the positive coefficients of the previous choice multiplied
with the return ratio received and interacted with same and different choice.
Notice that in this case the coefficient of (S 99K R) becomes insignificant. How-
ever, upon having received a high return ratio players increase their transfer even
if they choose a different player. Hence, the additional reward when choosing
the same player is the difference 16.4 − 8.1 = 8.3, which is significant. [??as
we make the point here to check same and different we should also do this for
RCP transfer1 as it could be that transfer increases in average transfer received
even if you choose someone who did not transfer to you in period t − 1] The
insignificance of S 99K R points to the fact that transfers are increased even if
return ratio is small. In other words, RCP 4 also holds in the unconditional
formulation.
The results for hypothesis RIF 2 are similar, for which evidence is provided
in specification T4. As in the choice setting we consider RCP and RIF sepa-
rately due to collinearity. Players do increase their transfer after high payoffs.
However, again they do so regardless to whether they repeat their choice or not.
While in the case of the return ratio the relative difference between the coeffi-
cients same and different choice was substantial, in the case of payoffs [??i do
not understand: it still significant but smaller. - the absolute difference never
matters. either the difference is less significant or the difference in terms of
transfers is smaller] Similar to the RCP hypothesis above, the insignificance of
S 99K R is evidence that transfer increase even if payoffs were very small. Here
we speak of positive reinforcement for all payoff values. A comparison of the
explanatory power of RCP 4 and RIF 2 shows that the latter one has a substan-
tially better fit to the data. Hence we will refer to evidence for reinforcement
as strong.
Hypothesis DLT 2 is addressed in table 6.5. We find evidence of directional
learning as the coefficient of 1 {rij ≥ 1/3} |s is significant. This means that
when having got back less than sent, the transfer decreases significantly by 23
points (18 - (-5)). Notice that this effect is smaller (7-(-5)=12 points) when
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Table 6.4: Transfer: estimation results 1
T1 T2 T3 T4
S 99K R 7.22 6.75 -.44 -5.1
(1.54)∗∗∗ (1.52)∗∗∗ (3.35) (3.7)
S L99 R 10.98 -19.26 -15.42 -12.73
(1.53)∗∗∗ (4.56)∗∗∗ (4.41)∗∗∗ (4.36)∗∗∗
(S L99 R) · τji . .33 .28 .24
(.05)∗∗∗ (.05)∗∗∗ (.05)∗∗∗
(S 99K R) · rij | s . . 16.37 .
(3.29)∗∗∗
rij | d . . 8.14 .
(3.19)∗∗
(S 99K R) · piij | s . . . .1
(.02)∗∗∗
piij | d . . . .06
(.01)∗∗∗
Obs. 2540 2540 2540 2540
R2 .21 .22 .24 .27
Note: | s and | d means that the variable is interacted with same (s) or different
(d) choice. Control variables are: gender, age, siblings, and nationality of sender and
receiver, dummies for session and treatments. Dummies for each period.
transferring to a new player. In T7 we investigate the alternative cutoff point
at 1/2. While the effect on transfers is still significant for the same choice, it is
now only 2.
Table 6.5: Transfer: estimation results 2
T6 T7
S 99K R -5.31 3.43
(4.54) (2.23)
S L99 R -17.32 -17.15
(4.28)∗∗∗ (4.46)∗∗∗
(S L99 R) · τji .31 .31
(.05)∗∗∗ (.05)∗∗∗
1{rij ≥ 1/3} | s 17.98 .
(3.93)∗∗∗
1{rij ≥ 1/3} | d 6.53 .
(2.26)∗∗∗
1{rij ≥ 1/2} | s . 5.75
(1.76)∗∗∗
1{rij ≥ 1/2} | d . 1.37
(1.81)
Obs. 2540 2540
R2 .24 .23
Note: see notes to table 6.4.
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Finally, hypothesis RTN 1 is widely confirmed by the data. Table 6.6 reports
the coefficients for the period dummy variables included in the regressions for
two specifications. It is evident that transfers increase slightly in the third
period relative to the second but drop on average by 5 points in the last period.
Notice that this is the case in both regressions T3 and T5, where once the ratio
returned and once the amount received was included. Hence the end game effect
is additional to any decreases in transfer that could have been induced by lower
receipts or return ratios in the previous period.
Table 6.6: Transfer: estimation results for period dummies
T3 T5
period 3 1.56 1.35
(.80)∗ (.80)∗
period 4 1.24 1.07
(.93) (.92)
period 5 .018 -.28
(1.05) (1.04)
period 6 -4.95 -5.26
( 1.91)∗∗ (1.89)∗∗∗
Note: Effects with respect to period 2. See notes to table 6.4.
Table 6.7 summarizes the main findings of this section.
Table 6.7: Transfer: summary of findings
hypothesis ...transfers are higher if evidence magnitude
RCP 3 the ratio returned was high yes 9
RCP 4 the receiver sent a lot yes 11
RIF 2 the payoff was high strong 14
DLT 2 the receiver returned more than 1/3 yes 11
...transfers are lower
RTN 1 in the last period yes -5
Note: Magnitude reports the effect on the transfer, which is evaluated at
the average of each variable.
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6.3 The amount sent back
In the last stage of the game, subjects decided how much of any amount trans-
ferred to them (multiplied by 3) to send back to the original sender. Let Git be
the amount that the Sender (who is indexed by i) gets back. From a receiver’s
perspective, the variable Git is the amount he pays back to the sender, and will
henceforth be called Pjit. This variable, which is naturally bounded by 3 times
the amount received τjit, will be the measure of return used in this section.
Due to the nature of the game, when players take the decision how much to
transfer back, they know already who has chosen them in this period t. Hence,
in period t receivers know if they are playing in a pair or not and by whom they
have been chosen.
The hypothesis are formulated from the perspective of the player that takes
action, i.e. the receiver.
Hypothesis RCP 5 The amount paid back is higher if the transfer received
was high.
Hypothesis RIF 3 The amount paid back is higher if received from a player
for the second time.
Hypothesis DLT 3 The amount paid back is lower if received from a player
for the second time.
Hypothesis RTN 2 The amount paid back is lower in the last period.
The choice of players in stage one of the game leads to a particular feature
of the data analyzed in this section. A player might have been chosen by 0, 1,
2, 3 or even 4 other players. Hence, at each period t there are between 0 and 4
observations for each player of an amount paid back. In total, of course, there
are as many observations as for the initial transfer.
The framework to be used in this section goes along the lines of section ??.
Consider the equation for the amount ratio returned
Pjit = αdjit + βdjit−1 + γdjit−1 + δXit + ηZjt + uit
where the variables are as defined above. Notice that for player j to make a
move in t, it has to be that he was chosen by i, ie dijt = 1.
Table 6.8 presents results for four specifications. The names S for sender
and R for receiver remain unchanged, even though it is now the receiver to take
action. Note that by default, the sender must have chosen the receiver in period
t, otherwise the receiver does not make a move. Thus, either S and R formed a
pair in t (if (S L99 R)t is one), or S chose R but not vice versa.
Specification P1 forms the starting point for the analysis. We find that
payback is on average about 24 units higher when receiving a transfer from the
same subject for the second time. This is evidence supporting hypothesis RIF
3 and is evidence against hypothesis DLT 3. We also find that a subject pays
back about 33 units more if he also sent a transfer to this subject in the same
round. This effect is not directly associated to one of our hypotheses. Notice
that sending a transfer to this subject in the previous round has no significant
effect (see coefficient of S L99
t−1
R).
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In specification P2 one can find support for hypothesis RCP 5. The amount
received increases the amount paid back. Notice in particular that coefficient of
the transfer received is 1.8. Together with the insignificant constant this shows
that on average for each token sent, which is multiplied by three, subjects pay
back 1.8, or, equivalently 60% of amount received. The functional relation be-
tween the transfer received and the amount paid back is not linear, as can be
seen from the positive and significant coefficient of the variable τ2ji in specifi-
cation P3. However, the curvature does not have a substantial impact in the
range 20 to 100 where 90% of the transfers can be found.
One might be pressed to interpret the decreasing period dummies in P1 to
P3 as evidence for Hypothesis RTN 2 that payback is lower in the last periods.
However, when we add interaction terms between period number and transfer
received (see P4) we find that the period dummies become insignificant. Instead
we now find significant decrease in return ratio from value 70% in period 4 to
50% in period 6. While transfers are lower in final periods (as shown in previous
section) less can only be paid back. Never-the-less, the decline in payback can
be explained only by declining return ratio. In other words, the rate of the
decline of payback is stronger than that of the decline in transfers.
Table 6.9 summarizes the main findings of this section.
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Table 6.8: Amount paid back : estimation results
P1 P2 P3 P4
S 99K
t−1
R 24.21 13.3 12.04 17.71
(5.88)∗∗∗ (4.8)∗∗∗ (4.78)∗∗ (4.5)∗∗∗
S L99
t−1
R 1.69 3.33 2.89 -1.52
(5.99) (4.65) (4.62) (4.64)
S L99
t
R 32.68 26.25 25.67 19.45
(5.16)∗∗∗ (4.56)∗∗∗ (4.54)∗∗∗ (4.6)∗∗∗
τjit . 1.83 .14 .
(.09)∗∗∗ (.28)
τ2jit . . .01 .
(.002)∗∗∗
period 3 -3.95 -7.24 -6.14 -14.38
(4.34) (3.77)∗ (3.77) (9.06)
period 4 -10.14 -12.57 -12.16 -3.95
(4.93)∗∗ (3.84)∗∗∗ (3.86)∗∗∗ (7.98)
period 5 -28.42 -29.73 -29.08 -1.17
(6.3)∗∗∗ (5.6)∗∗∗ (5.63)∗∗∗ (7.93)
period 6 -74.83 -65 -65.22 -4.96
(7.82)∗∗∗ (7.06)∗∗∗ (6.99)∗∗∗ (9.63)
τji· period 2 . . . 2.11
(.11)∗∗∗
τji· period 3 . . . 2.18
(.12)∗∗∗
τji· period 4 . . . 2.01
(.11)∗∗∗
τji· period 5 . . . 1.77
(.13)∗∗∗
τji· period 6 . . . 1.49
(.17)∗∗∗
Const. 35.02 -109.44 -64.35 -55.84
(68.58) (57.85)∗ (58.4) (57.81)
Obs. 2540 2540 2540 2420
R2 .22 .42 .43 .42
Note: Control variables are: gender, age, siblings, and nationality of sender and
receiver, dummies for session and treatments.
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Table 6.9: Return: summary of findings
hypothesis ...the amount paid back is evidence magnitude
RCP 5 higher if the transfer received was high yes 30
RIF 3 higher if the received for two consecutive periods yes 13 / 18 a
DLT 3 lower if the received for two consecutive periods no
RTN 2 lower in the last period no
additional findings
higher if transfer sent to same player yes 26 / 19 a
The return ratio is lower in final periods yes -34b
Note: Magnitude reports the effect on the amount paid back, which is evaluated at
the average of each variable. a The values correspond to specification P2 / P4. b Drop
is measured relative to period 5.
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6.4 Tracking individual behavior
[preliminary] This section investigates if observed individual behavior is consis-
tent at various stages of the game. To this end we compare the propensity to
behave according to a certain motive at different stages of the game for each
individual.
Consider Hypotheses RCP 3, addressed in specification T2. The coefficient
of (S L99 R) · τji can be interpreted as the degree of reciprocity. This coefficient
is estimated for each of the 110 individuals. Analogously, hypothesis RCP 5, in
specification P2, translates into the effect of τjit, which is estimated for each
participant. Figure 6.1 correlates the individual coefficients obtained for each
of the above estimates.
Figure 6.1: Consistency of RCP
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The positive correlation indicates that each an individual that showed a
high degree of reciprocity when transferring money, confirms this behavior at
the stage of return.
The same exercise can be repeated for the reinforcement hypothesis. The
candidate coefficients are piij in specification T4 and S 99K R in specification
P2. Figure 6.2 shows a scatter of the two variables, confirming the consistency
of behavior also for the reinforcement motive.
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Figure 6.2: Consistency of RIF
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6.5 Predetermined Treatment
In the following we briefly present and compare the findings in the control
or predetermined treatment where the receiver of each sender was randomly
assigned. Of course one has to take into account for these comparisons that the
predetermined treatment only involved 1/5 of the number of observations as the
free choice treatment.
Comparing tables 6.4 and 6.10 we make the following observations. From T1
we see that there are now no significant dependence on choice behavior in the
previous round. Looking at T2-T4 we see a that higher transfers received in fact
now trigger lower own transfers. [??difficult to interpret] Degree of reciprocity
or reinforcement due to transferring to same subject again does not change
significantly.
Table 6.10: Transfer predetermined : estimation results 1
T1 T2 T3 T4
S 99K R .96 1 -6.6 -14.26
(3.14) (3.13) (7.98) (8.79)
S L99 R 4.35 31.04 30.71 30.51
(6.51) (9.42)∗∗∗ (10.01)∗∗∗ (9.89)∗∗∗
(S L99 R) · τji . -.3 -.29 -.29
(.14)∗∗ (.14)∗∗ (.14)∗∗
(S 99K R) · rij | s . . 24.36 .
(13.63)∗
rij | d . . 10.87 .
(4.45)∗∗
(S 99K R) · piij | s . . . .16
(.05)∗∗∗
piij | d . . . .06
(.02)∗∗∗
Obs. 437 437 437 437
R2 .17 .18 .19 .22
Note: | s and | d means that the variable is interacted with same (s) or different
(d) choice. Control variables are: gender, age, siblings, and nationality of sender
and receiver, dummies for session and treatments. Dummies for each period. 550
observations in total. In 550 - 113 = 437 a positive transfer was made.
[??do not see much in the following table so we could drop this one and say
that there was not much difference.]
[??what about end game effect? we could state result without presenting
table]
Most importantly we observe an overall lower return ratio of 34% and find
that it only is lower in the final period where it takes the value of 20%.
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Table 6.11: Transfer predetermined : estimation results 2
T6 T7
S 99K R -9.28 .46
(10.89) (4.02)
S L99 R 29.59 31.1
(9.79)∗∗∗ (9.51)∗∗∗
(S L99 R) · τji -.28 -.3
(.14)∗∗ (.14)∗∗
1{rij ≥ 1/3} | d 17.34 .
(11.04)
1{rij ≥ 1/3} | s 6.58 .
(2.84)∗∗
1{rij ≥ 1/2} | s . 1.6
(6.12)
1{rij ≥ 1/2} | d . .17
(3.43)
Obs. 437 437
R2 .2 .18
Table 6.12: Transfer: estimation results for period dummies, predetermined
T3 T5
period 3 .05 .05
(2.52) (2.53)
period 4 1.61 1.83
(2.89) (2.92)
period 5 2.02 2.22
(2.75) (2.79)
period 6 -9.05 -8.89
(4.61)∗ (4.59)∗
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Table 6.13: Returned ratio / amount paid back : estimation results
P1 P2 P3 P4
S 99K R 32.55 24.54 23 22.77
(16.02)∗∗ (15.15) (15.7) (15.12)
S L99 R 4.26 2.08 1.86 1.81
(8.82) (8.19) (8.15) (8.45)
S L99
t
R 22.27 18.81 18.93 18.99
(7.04)∗∗∗ (6.7)∗∗∗ (6.7)∗∗∗ (6.92)∗∗∗
τji . 1.02 .21 .
(.11)∗∗∗ (.38)
τ2ji . . .006 .
(.003)∗∗
period 3 .25 1 1.54 4.69
(8.13) (7.47) (7.47) (18.92)
period 4 -8.19 -9.34 -9.68 16.21
(9.62) (9.12) (9.09) (19.54)
period 5 -32.53 -34.15 -34.23 -10.42
(10.52)∗∗∗ (9.88)∗∗∗ (9.89)∗∗∗ (19.07)
period 6 -65.6 -53.16 -53.76 -6.33
(12.88)∗∗∗ (11.82)∗∗∗ (11.89)∗∗∗ (18)
τji· period 2 . . . 1.31
(.19)∗∗∗
τji· period 3 . . . 1.26
(.2)∗∗∗
τji· period 4 . . . .99
(.2)∗∗∗
τji· period 5 . . . 1.02
(.22)∗∗∗
τji· period 6 . . . .67
(.21)∗∗∗
Const. -15.62 -88.08 -66.1 -122.91
(64.63) (60.28) (60.86) (60.27)∗∗
Obs. 437 437 437 437
R2 .25 .36 .36 .37
Note: The first two variables refer to t−1. | s and | d means that the variable is
refers to the same (s) or different (d) choice for the Receiver, compared to the
previous period. Control variables are: gender, age, siblings, and nationality of
sender and receiver, dummies for session and treatments.
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7 Final remark
This paper analyzes the determinants of trust and trustworthiness in an ex-
periment where trust can emerge as the result of repeated interaction between
individuals. We add an element of choice to the setting of a repeated trust game,
in that players have the opportunity to choose among four players. For each
opponent, players see information such as age, nationality and gender. The in-
fluence of four different behavioral and learning theories is looked at: directional
learning, reinforcement learning, reciprocity and rationality. The econometric
analysis goes along the three stages of the game: choice, transfer and return,
controlling for confounding factors. It sheds light on the behavioral motives
behind each decision. The low degree of formalization and a certain degree of
observational equivalence makes a clear discrimination between the competing
approaches impossible. While it is not possible to attribute the entire playing
behavior to a single type, at each decision several motives seem to influence the
decisions taken, some being of higher explanatory power than others. It was
shown that a mixture of several motives is at play at each stage of the game.
In the same way as rationality does not offer a satisfying explanation for the
behavior of the players, none of the alternative motives such as reinforcement
or reciprocity is able to capture all facets of the observed behavior.
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A Appendix A: Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1: Histogram of transfer, periodwise
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Figure A.2: Histogram of returned ratio, periodwise
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Figure A.3: Histogram of transfer, predetermined treatment, periodwise
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Figure A.4: Histogram of returned ratio, predetermined treatment, periodwise
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B Appendix B: Experimental design
B.1 Instructions
Screen 1
• You will randomly be matched with 4 other players to play a game.
31
• Each game consists of three stages which will be described on the fol-
lowing screens.
• The game will be repeated for 6 periods with the same players.
• After the 6 periods, you will randomly be re-matched with four new
players.
• This re-matching will be repeated six times (time permitting).
Screen 2
Stage 1 of 3
Your endowment in each period is 100 points, equivalent to 0.35 Euros
You can choose if you want to transfer any points to your fellow players or not.
If so, you decide to whom and how much. You can choose only one person
and you can transfer any amount between 0 and 100. If you decided not to
transfer points at all, just click the button.
Every transfer made in stage 1 will be multiplied by the factor 3 as it
arrives on the other player’s account.
Screen 3
In stage 1 the other 4 players have simultaneously made a similar decision to
yours. Due to the simultaneity their choice does not depend on your decision.
Stage 2 of 3
You will see who of the other players have chosen you and how much has
been transferred to you. It might be that you were chosen by none, 1, 2, 3 or
even all 4 players.
If you got a transfer from a player, you can decide if and how much you want
to transfer back to this player. You can transfer back anything between zero
and three times the initial transfer to you. If you were chosen by more than
one player, you can choose different amounts for each of them.
Screen 4
Stage 3 of 3
In this stage you see the results of the period, how much you transferred and
how much the player you have chosen initially transferred back to you.
You will also see the profit in Euro you made in this period.
Screen 5
Remember...
• After you finished playing the three stages, you will play this game six
times with the same players.
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• After the 6 periods, you will randomly be re-matched with four new
players.
• This re-matching will be repeated six times (time permitting).
Do you want to read the instructions again or continue directly with a short
quiz?
Screen before the predetermined treatment
The game you will play now is slightly different from the one you have played
before.
Contrary to the previous game, in Stage 1 you will not have the possibility
to choose a player. Instead, a random choice will be made for you. You can
only decide how much you want to transfer to the player already determined.
Notice that this also affects stage 2, as it is now random by how many players
you were chosen.
B.2 Privacy Statement
The privacy and Anonymity statement reads as follows.
All information we collect undergoes a strict anonymization process, not only
ensuring anonymity among players but also ensuring that you stay anonymous
to us. No private information will be collected. During the experiment you
will see some information about your fellow players. We have ensured that
you cannot identify them personally, and vice versa, they cannot identify you.
Remember that this experiment runs over different rooms, thus involving much
more individuals than those seated in your room. At the end of the session, you
will be asked to type in the account number you obtained before. Please keep
this number, because after notification you can pick up an envelope with your
payment at the porters lodge.
B.3 Screenshots
See figures B.1 to B.5 for some black and white screenshots of the game.
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Figure B.1: Screenshot of the CV information
Figure B.2: Screenshot of the first stage
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Figure B.3: Screenshot of the second stage
Figure B.4: Screenshot of the third stage
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Figure B.5: Screenshot of the first stage of the predetermined treatment
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Table B.1: Results of the quiz: percent of all answers
Question
Answer 1 2 3
A 19 1 1
B 21 95∗ 5
C 60∗ 4 94∗
Note: ∗ denotes the correct answer.
B.4 Quiz
Note: Subjects always saw the actual values of the expressions involvingX,Y, Z.
Question 1: [Subjects had to choose an amount X between 1 and 100.] ”Imagine
you transferred X points to player two in stage 1. Assume further that she made
no transfer to you in stage 1. How many points can you transfer back to her in
stage 2 at most?”
A: 3X B: X C: 0
Question 2: [Subjects drew random number Y between 0 and 100 by clicking
on a button.] ”Your drew the number Y . Assume you transferred this amount
to one player in stage one. How much can the other player transfer back to you
at most?”
A: 0 B: 3Y C: Y
Question 3: ”Please press the button below to determine randomly how much
you will be paid back. Remember that this number can be between 0 and
3Y .” [next screen] ”Summary Question: Initially, from your 100 points you
transferred Y to the player. Let us assume the player transferred you back Z in
the next stage. You had no interaction with other players. Based on this, what
is the balance on your account?”
A: 0 B: 3Y C: 100− Y + Z
Table B.4 summarizes the results. Subjects got a feedback screen after each an-
swer indicating if they were correct or mistaken and stating the correct answer.
While in the first question many subjects made mistakes, in questions 2 and 3
almost all subject answered correctly.
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